THE RECLAMATION REFORM ACT--P.E.S.T. OR PESTICIDE by Moore, Charles V.
The  Reclamation  Reform  Act-
P.E.S.T.  or Pesticide
Charles V.  Moore
Anyone  familiar  with the  evolution  of
institutions  will  agree that bit by bit  reg-
ulations can be modified,  changed,  or ad-
justed  in  implementation  and  enforce-
ment  so  that,  though  the  shell  of  the
original house may remain,  so many walls
have been moved and additions added that
all that remains  in fact  is the name. Func-
tionally  it  performs  a different  service  to
a  different  clientele.
The intent of the drafters of the original
1902 Reclamation  Act was, in a few words,
"land  for  the  landless,  homes  for  the
homeless."  Even  the  Omnibus  Adjust-
ments  Act  of  1926  did  not  significantly
change  the intent of the original law.
The  objectives  of  this  paper  are  to  (1)
describe  the  principal  actors  in  the  Rec-
lamation  game  in  recent  years  and  iden-
tify some of their goals and objectives;  (2)
set the stage for analyzing  recent changes
in Reclamation  legislation  in terms of  po-
litical economic-seeking  transfers  (PESTs);
(3)  highlight  major  changes  offered  and
finally  adopted  in  the  1982  Reclamation
Reform Act, and (4) offer a prognosis with
respect  to the  impact  of  this  new  law  on
western irrigated  agriculture.
Historical Developments
The  Reclamation  program  has  tradi-
tionally  had  three  important  and  orga-
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nized  support  groups.  First,  the  National
Water  Resource  Association  which  over
the years  has supported,  in  principle,  ex-
pansion  of  Reclamation  development  al-
though never deeply involved in tinkering
with  the  institutions,  rules,  and  regula-
tions  except  to  the  extent  they  would
impede  continued  project  expansion.
Membership  was  weighted  heavily  to-
wards  engineers,  contractors,  and  firms
who sold  things for construction  and  irri-
gation.
Second,  there  existed  an  amorphous
group  of Western  Congressmen  centered
in  the  House  Committee  on  Interior  and
Insular  Affairs.  This  group  was  also  pro-
development  and responsive to the wishes
and  desires  of  their  electorate  to  whom
they  could  provide  construction  projects,
subsidized  water, and low  cost hydroelec-
tric  power.  The  third  group  consisted  of
administrators  of the U.S.  Department  of
the Interior.  Charged  with implementing
the  basic  law  over  the  years,  this  group
was generally sympathetic  to local groups
interested  in  easing  the  pinch  caused  by
the rules on the size of farms and the own-
ership of land within Federal projects. One
of  the best  examples  was the  Interior  So-
licitor's  Opinion  of  February  1933,  ex-
empting  the  Imperial  Irrigation  District
from the 160 acre limit to ownership.  (See
Ogden for  a chronology  of these  events.)
Not until the 1970s was a group formed
to challenge  this  "iron triangle."  National
Land for People, a  small group represent-
ing  farm  workers  and  small  farmers  in
California,  entered  not  in  an  attempt  to
stop  the  irrigation  development  process,
but  rather  to  redistribute  the  benefits  of
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development.  National  Land  for  People
brought  suit  in Federal  Court  seeking  to
require  the Department  of the Interior to
codify  its  rule  making  procedure  to  hold
public  hearings on any proposed rules and
regulations.
The  impetus  of  this  action  was  the
500,000  acre  Westlands  Water District  of
California,  the  largest  district  in  the  Bu-
reau's  system.  Lands  in  the  district  had
been  developed  prior to the project  using
ground water that was being heavily over-
drafted.  Ownership  of land in the district
was  highly  concentrated  with  one  corpo-
ration  holding  over  100,000  acres.  Al-
though much of the land had been placed
under  recordable  contract  to  be  sold  in
160 acre  units, National  Land  for People
was  disturbed  by  what  it  considered
"sweetheart"  sales  and  leasebacks,  which
it  asserted  were  evasions  of the intent  of
the 1902 Act and prevented people it rep-
resented from  purchasing  these lands and
from sharing  in the  benefits  of the subsi-
dized  water.
In  August  1976  the  Federal  District
Court ruled for National Land  for People
and instructed  the Secretary  of Interior to
prepare  Rules  and  Regulations  and  hold
public hearings  (Ogden, page 126).
The then Secretary of the Interior, Cecil
Andrus, published the Proposed  Rules and
Regulations  one  year  later.  Negative  re-
action  to  the  regulations  from  existing
landowners  triggered several local and one
regional  organization  in  opposition.  Ex-
amples  are  California  Westside  Farmers,
Imperial Valley Farmers for Fairness, and
Western  Water and  Land Alliance.
Thus, the cast of  actors  in this drama  is
complete.  On one  side is a small  group of
farm  workers  and  small  farmers  with
fragmented  outside  support  but  with  a
sympathetic  Secretary  of the Interior.  On
the  other  side  are  several  local  and  re-
gional  organizations  with  memberships
dominated  by  large  landowners  and  op-
erators  with  support  from  existing  farm
organizations  such  as  state  farm  bureaus.
With  this  information  we  can  identify
those proposals  that  were  opposed by  the
large  landowners  and  the  political  steps
taken to modify  these regulations.
The  Proposed  Rules  and  Regulations
restated  the  residency  requirement  that
landowners  must live on or near their land.
This  would  have eliminated  the  absentee
landlord  and greatly  reduced the amount
of land available for rent within  a project.
The  proposal  also  allowed  a  doubling  of
the ownership  limit to 320 acres, but own-
ers  had  to  be  18  years  or  older,  which
would  have  eliminated  a common  prac-
tice  of  placing  ownership  of  land  in  the
names of minor children.  The item in the
proposed  regulation,  second  only  to  the
residency  requirement  in  generating
heated  debate;  was that  for the first  time
an  acreage  limit  was to  be  placed  on  the
size of farm  operating  units  as well  as on
the  size  of  land  ownership.  Thus,  under
the proposed  new  rules,  owned  land  plus
leased  land  could  not  exceed  960  acres.
The  August  1977  rules  proposed  to  elim-
inate  "sweetheart"  sales  by  requiring  all
lands  in  excess  of  the ownership  limit  to
be  sold by  lottery  at a price  equal  to the
current  appraised  value  of  the land  as  if
the project  had not been built.
Before  Interior had  completed  its pub-
lic  hearings  on  the  Proposed  Rules  and
Regulations,  a group  of  landowners  filed
suit  in  Federal  District  Court  asking that
Secretary Andrus be enjoined from imple-
menting  the  final  rules  and  regulations
until an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) had been completed.  Assertions were
made that small farms  would increase soil
erosion,  fill  lakes  and  rivers  with  pesti-
cides, cause thousands of acres to be aban-
doned,  allow  urban  sprawl  to  take  over
existing  farm  lands,  and  above  all,  raise
the cost of  food  significantly.  Interior did
not  fight  this suit  and  the  court  granted
the  injunction  and  ordered  the  prepara-
tion of the EIS.
The  court  order  achieved  two  signifi-
cant  goals  for  the  landowners:  (1) it  de-
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layed implementation  while also allowing
existing  landowners  to  continue  opera-
tions  for at  least  two more  years;  and  (2)
more  importantly  it  provided  time to  at-
tempt  a  shift  of  the  rule-making  process
from  the  Executive  Branch  to  the Legis-
lative  Branch.
PESTs
In his paper,  "Political  Economic  Mar-
kets:  PERTs and  PESTs  in  Food and  Ag-
riculture,"  Rausser  defined  PESTs  as  po-
litical, economic-seeking  transfers.  Citing
Madison's Federalist  Paper,  No.  10, Raus-
ser  argued  that the  system  of checks  and
balances built into our Federal system,  "...
makes it costly for any interest group, ma-
jority  or minority, to  use the political  sys-
tem to redistribute  wealth  and  income  in
their  favor."  However,  because  the  pro-
cess  is  costly,  does  not  mean  that  an  in-
vestment  in  PEST activities  is  not worth-
while  to  an  individual  or  special  interest
group.
PEST activities generally center around
lobbying of  policy makers and their staffs
in  both  the  Legislative  and  Executive
Branches  of  government,  although  they
may  include  use  of the  courts  to  resolve
differences  and  to delay  actions.  This ac-
tivity can  indeed become  expensive if  we
can  believe  the  rumors  that  a  first  class
lobbyist  in  Washington,  D.C.  receives  up
to  $10,000  per  month  plus  expenses.  Di-
rectly  related to  legislative  lobbying,  and
in a  limited way  a necessary  condition,  is
access to elected officials through Political
Action Committee  (PAC) contributions  to
election  campaigns.
Before  entering  the  political-economic
market  in  order  to  seek  an  increased  in-
come stream,  lump  sum transfer,  or  pro-
tection  of property  rights in  an asset  rep-
resenting  a  future  income  stream,  the
special interest group must make the same
calculation  of expected  return  on  invest-
ment  as  for  any  other  financial  decision.
However,  the  probability  distribution  of
costs  and  benefits  no doubt  has a  greater
variance  than those  associated  with more
traditional investment opportunities.  These
distributions  are  also  probably  not  nor-
mally  distributed,  but  this  would  vary
from  case  to case  depending  on  the level
of the countervailing  forces competing  in
the market.
One  element  of uncertainty  in the  po-
litical-economic  market  is  the  possibility
that election  results may change  the faces
and philosophies of the policy makers who
have been the targets of previous lobbying
efforts.  In  the  case  of  the  1980  general
election, the change in administration did
just  that.  The  chairmanship  of  the  con-
cerned  senate  committee  changed,  and
new faces  appeared  on  the committee.  A
new Secretary of the Interior was appoint-
ed, and he brought with him a  new set of
assistant secretaries  and agency heads with
new philosophies.
PEST  activities  probably  attain  their
greatest leverage  during an election  cam-
paign.  Political  support,  both  monetary
and nonmonetary, can be used at this time
either  to  elect  more  favorable  represen-
tation or to gain improved access to exist-
ing representatives.
Common  Cause,  a  nonprofit  national
organization,  tabulates contributions  made
by Political  Action Committees  (PACs) to
election campaigns.  This organization  has
classified  132  PACs  registered  with  the
Federal  Election  Commission  as  agricul-
turally  related.  PACs  representing  land
and water resource based groups in the 17
Western  states, a  total of  34, were  classed
as  having  an  interest  in  Reclamation  re-
form  legislation.  Those  ranged from  J.  G.
Boswell Company Employees'  PAC to the
National  Association  of  Wheat  Growers'
PAC.
Results  of  this tabulation  provide  some
interesting  insights  into  the  PEST  game.
The  34  selected  PACs  contributed
$566,515  during  the  period  January  1,
1981,  through November 22, 1982, an  av-
erage of $16,662 per PAC. Not all of these
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funds  were  directly  related to  the  Recla-
mation  Reform  Act,  and  contributions
were  made  to  308  candidates  for  an  av-
erage of $1,839 per candidate.  Most of the
PACs had a California orientation, and not
surprisingly, $265,000 or 46 per cent went
to candidates  in California.
Getting down  to specific details  related
to the reform  legislation,  members of the
House-Senate  Conference  Committee  re-
ceived  $82,225.  The  five  congressmen
representing  the  San  Joaquin  Valley  of
California,  two of  whom  were  also  mem-
bers  of  the  Conference  Committee,  re-
ceived  $91,150.  One  interesting  sidelight
was that  Pete  Wilson,  the  successful  can-
didate  for  Senator  from  California  run-
ning  against  Jerry  Brown,  received  the
largest  amount of contributions,  $73,100.
Jerry Brown  received  zero  dollars.
1982 Act,  PL 97-293
On October  12, 1982, President Reagan
signed  into  law  the  Reclamation  Reform
Act.  Table  1 is  an  attempt  to depict  the
evolution  of  this  law  over  a five-year  pe-
riod and through two administrations.  The
Andrus  proposal  contained  most  of  the
elements in the original proposed  rules and
regulations.  However,  after  public  hear-
ings Secretary  Andrus modified his stance
on  the disposition  of  excess  land  to  allow
land  to  be  sold  to  family  members,  ad-
joining  neighbors,  and  longtime  tenants
but  added  the  requirement  that  eligible
owners must  be 18  years  or older.
Major  changes  over  the  1902  Act,  as
amended,  included  a  doubling  of  the
acreage limit per  owner to 320 acres. The
limit on total farm size of 960 acres owned
plus  leased  land  was  probably  the  most
significant  change.  Another  change  was
the restatement  of the residency  require-
ment followed by the lottery requirement
for  the  sale  of  excess  lands.  To  close  a
loophole  created  by  the  1926  Omnibus
Act,  a  provision  was  included  requiring
cross-district  compliance.  This  provision
prohibits land ownership in more than one
district if the sum of the acreages  exceeds
the limitation.
The  Draft  EIS  published  by  the  De-
partment  of  the  Interior  contained  an
analysis  of  the  proposed  rules  and  regu-
lations  and  of  a limited  number  of alter-
natives.  At the suggestion of the Economic
Research  Service,  USDA,  which  was  col-
laborating  in  the EIS,  full-cost  pricing  of
water was considered.
The  first  session  of  the  97th  Congress
addressed  the  reclamation  reform  issue
and bills were  passed out of committee in
both houses;  however,  little  or  no  agree-
ment could be reached  and these bills died
at the end of the session.
Under  a new  administration  and  a  re-
organized  Senate,  both  of  which  were
more sympathetic to  the point of view  of
the  landowners,  bills were  passed  in  both
houses  and  sent to  a conference  commit-
tee  to  resolve  differences.  Provisions  of
each bill and the final result are presented
in Table  1.
Prior to action by  the conference  com-
mittee the farm press reported satisfaction
on the part of the landowners  and  results
of  their PEST  activities  during and  after
the  1981  elections.  Lobbyists  were  most
pleased with the Senate bill that contained
the most liberal limitations  for both indi-
viduals  and  large  corporations  and  the
lowest  interest  rates  for  calculating  the
full-cost  price  for water.
As  indicated  in  Table  1,  the  final  bill
followed  the House bill more closely than
the  Senate  version,  no  doubt  to  the  dis-
appointment  of  the  PACs  who had  con-
tributed  so generously to the 1980 election
and  to  the  lobbying  efforts  of  their  rep-
resentatives.
The  net  effect  of  PEST  activities  can
best by shown by comparing  the final bill
with  the  Andrus  bill  offered  four  years
earlier.  The  ownership  limit  was  tripled,
both  the  lottery  and  residency  require-
ment  were  eliminated,  and  Corps  of  En-
gineers'  projects  were exempted  from the
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TABLE  1. Reclamation  Reform:  Comparison  of Proposed  and Final  Legislation.
Topic  Andrusa  House  Senate  Final
Acreage  Limit per Owner  320 acres  960  1,280  960b
Total  Farm  Limit  960  acres  960 ac.  +  1,280 ac.  +  960 ac.  +
full cost  full cost  full cost
Age  Limit  18 years  none  none  none
Large  Corporations  480  acres  160 ac.  +  640 ac. +  320 ac.  +
full cost  full cost  full cost
Sale by Lottery  Yes  No  No  No
Antispeculation  15 years  10 years  10 years  10 years
Full  Cost Water  Price  No  Yes  Yes  Yes
Interest  Rate  NA  Min. 5%,  T.  No  min.  Min.  7.5%
bill rate  ave.  long  ave.  long
term  bonds  term  bonds
Project  Exemptions  Statutory  Statutory,  Statutory,  Statutory,
Corps Proj.  Corps  Proj.  Corps Proj.
Residency Required  Yes  No  No  No
Cross-District Compliance  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
a Presented to Senate Committee  on Energy  and  Natural  Resources, April  13, 1978.
b Individual under  P.L.  97-293 is defined  as any natural  person,  including his  or her spouse and  including other
dependents thereof  (i.e., a family).
law.  This  last item was  of  special interest
to  a  single  PAC  representing  a  single
farming corporation.
Special  mention  should be made  of the
full-cost  pricing  provision  that  appeared
in  both  the  House  and  Senate  versions.
This  provision  was  supported  by  liberals
and  conservatives  but  for  different  rea-
sons.  Conservatives,  at  least  those  from
outside  the  West, saw  this  provision  as  a
means  of  increasing  Federal  revenues  to
reduce  the budget  deficit.  Liberals,  espe-
cially  from  the  West,  viewed  this  provi-
sion  as  a  method  of  encouraging  water
conservation  in  Federal projects.  As econ-
omists  we are aware of the importance  of
the interest rate in determining costs.  The
final  bill,  although  a  compromise,  raises
the cost  of water for  lands exceeding  the
960  acre  limit  above the  cost  obtained  if
the  Senate  formula  is  applied.  The  im-
pacts  will be  discussed  in  a later  section.
Rules and Regulations-1983  Act
Department  of  the  Interior,  Bureau  of
Reclamation,  is required  to  develop  rules
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and  regulations  to  implement  legislation
passed  by Congress.  PEST activities  need
not  cease with  final  passage  of  a  bill  and
its  signing  into  law.  On  May  3,  1983,  a
new  set of  rules and regulations  was pub-
lished  (Federal Register).  One  feature at-
tracted considerable attention. Individuals
and  districts wishing to take advantage  of
acreage limits under the 1983  Act  are re-
quired to amend  their  contracts with  the
Bureau.  Districts  failing  to  amend  con-
tracts will come under a  very  strict inter-
pretation of the old law, i.e., water for 320
acres owned  by  a husband  and  wife  and
full-cost  pricing  on  any leased  land  after
April  1987.  This  will  place  operators  of
large  leased  acreages  in  a  bind  and  un-
doubtedly  will be  tested in the courts.
A  second  provision,  one  that  has  re-
ceived  less attention  but has  implications
for beginning  or  entering  farmers,  is  the
anti-speculation  provision.  If a landowner
fails  to  sell excess  land  under  recordable
contract  in  the  time  allowed,  the  Secre-
tary  of  the  Interior  will  sell  the  land  by
auction.  Any  surplus  revenues  from  the
sale of the excess  land  over the appraised
December 1983P.E.S.T. or Pesticide




Converted  to  Rules  &
Acre-Foot  E.I.S.  Regs.  Per  Estimated
Average  Rate  Estimated  Acre-Foot  Maximumc
Supply  (Subsidized)  Full-Cost  Full  Cost  Ability to
District  1972-1976  1978  Rate 1978  1983  Pay 1978
...  acre-feet  pe r acre  ...............................................................  D  ollars  ............................................................
Black Canyon  5.20  1.41  15.77
Coachella  6.31  7.00  26.27  13.40  9.00
Columbia  Basin  East  4.19  4.19  41.16  14.05  21.00
Farwell  1.20  10.50  135.50  50.50  66.00
Glenn-Colusa  0.71a  (5.88)b  1.46  17.85  7.85  9.00
Goleta  1.84  59.24  263.12
Goshen  2.10  4.22  22.96  -
Grand  Valley  5.40  1.18  31.10
Altus-Lugert  0.52  18.58  143.19  78.44  0
Milk River  0.80  7.79  119.13  14.00  32.00
Moon  Lake  1.13  1.75  7.04
Oroville-Tonasket  4.40  11.47  21.33
Truckee-Carson  3.38  2.19  33.46  3.00  75.00
Welton-Mohawk  6.96  4.80  29.58  11.42  32.00
Westlands  2.54  15.80  67.56  40.90  36.00
a Federal  water delivery per acre.
b Total water delivery per acre.
c  Source:  [USDI,  1981],  water price where  net farm  income equals zero using excess  land value.
value  will be credited  to the  Reclamation
Fund.  This  approach  is  appealing  from
the point  of  view  that selling  the land  at
market  value  captures  the economic  rent
attributable to the project once and for all,
precluding future supervision costs to pro-
hibit  speculation.  The  disadvantage  lies
with the potential  entrant  wishing to buy
land  at  the  lower  appraised  excess  land
value.  This  new  procedure  will  certainly
increase  the barriers to entry  into farming
and  thwart  one  of  the  objectives  of  the
1902  Act.
Based  on  the  1982  Act,  the  Bureau  is
required to calculate the full cost of water
for all contractors  and districts with lands
in  farms  in  excess  of  960  acres.  Table  2
reports three water costs at the farm head-
gate:  the  1978  subsidized  rate;  the  1978
estimate of full cost published in the Draft
EIS;  and  my  estimate  of the  full  cost  at
the farm  headgate  using  Bureau prelimi-
nary  data  developed  with  the  formula
prescribed in the 1982 Act. The major dif-
ference  between  the  estimated  full  cost
calculated for the Draft  EIS and the  pre-
liminary  full  cost  under  the  1982  Act  is
that unpaid interest prior to the 1982  Act
is forgiven.  The Draft EIS charged  for in-
terest from commencement  of the project.
The  difference  between  the two  costs  es-
timates decrease  for the newer  projects.
Prognosis
There  used  to  be  a  saying  around  the
West that, "If you can't find a loophole  in
the  Reclamation  Law,  you  should  find  a
new  lawyer."  It  is not  clear  from  a  read-
ing of both the new law and the proposed
rules  and  regulations just  how  much  lati-
tude there is for landowners and operators
to maneuver.  I foresee enforcement  prob-
lems in two areas. First, is under the head-
ing of trusts. For example, lands placed in
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trust for a minor child do not count against
the entitlement of  a trustee who may also
be  a  landowner  receiving  project  water.
Second  is in the area  of the management-
service  companies that operate  as  profes-
sional managers,  except that  risk bearing
is  negotiable.  These  firms  supply  all  ma-
chinery, labor, and other inputs and charge
on a  custom-rate  basis.
Fifteen of the original 18 case study dis-
tricts  used  in  the EIS are still covered by
Reclamation  acreage limitations.  Seven  or
almost half  of  these districts  had  no farm
operations over 960 acres; thus there would
be  no  impact on  these  districts  under  the
new  regulations  (Table  3).  When  West-
lands Water District  is excluded  from the
impacted  districts,  the  remaining  seven
districts report only 83 farms (with 132,258
acres  of  land)  in  excess  of  the  960  acre
limit.  Keep  in  mind  however,  that  only
39,000 acres of these  lands will be subject
to full-cost  pricing.
As  usual,  Westlands  becomes  a  special
case.  In  the  1978  land  tenure  survey,
Westlands  reported  133  farms  operating
a  total  of  475,111  acres  (an  average  of
3,572  per farm)  in excess  of the  960 acre
limit.  About  350,000  acres  would be  sub-
ject  to full-cost  pricing.
The  question  to  ask  our  crystal  ball  is
how many of these  farms in excess of  960
acres  will  be  willing  to  pay  the  full-cost
price for irrigation  water in  order to con-
tinue  operating?  The  answer  must  come
in  three  parts.  First,  what  is the  full-cost
water rate in those districts reporting farms
in  excess  of  the  960  acre  limit?  Second,
will  the affected farm  operators treat the
full-cost  price  on lands  over  the  limit  as
the  marginal  cost  of  water,  or  will  they
simply blend the two water costs and treat
it, although irrationally,  as a weighted av-
erage cost? Third, will the increased  costs
to large farms allow farms of less than 960
acres  to bid  away  lease  holds  from these
large  operations?  Table  2  reports  the  es-
timated full costs and  the subsidized  costs
for water in those  case study districts with
land  in farms  over 960 acres.  These rates
can be compared  with the estimated max-
imum ability  to pay calculations  from the
same study and reasonable  guesses  can be
made  on  the resulting farm  size distribu-
tion.  Only  one  district  (Altus-Lugert  in
Oklahoma)  of the 8 districts with farms in
excess  of the 960 limit  will probably  find
the  full-cost  price  creating  an  economic
limit  to farm  size.  Farm  operators  in the
remaining  seven districts, including West-
lands,  will probably opt to pay the higher
costs.
Westwide,  a generalization  can be made
about  the  future  rate  of  change  in  farm
sizes.  For over 75 years there has been no
limit on farm size in Reclamation  districts
because  of unlimited  leasing.  One  would
guess  that the  trend in farm  size  in  these
districts  will  continue  to  follow  the trend
for all irrigated farms for the next decade
or  so,  and  that the 1982  Reclamation  Act
will  have little or no effect on  farm  size.
Lessons Learned
PEST activities are analogous  to a high-
ly competitive market with firms or a con-
sortia  of  firms  attempting  to  capture  an
increased  share  of  that  market-a  zero
sum game.
What did  each side  gain or lose  in  this
contest?  What  return did  each  get for  its
investment?  Whether  one  starts  with the
original  1902  Act  or  from  Secretary  An-
drus'  proposed  legislation,  the large land-
owner  group certainly  moved to a higher
utility  function.  The  large  farm  consor-
tium got rid of the residency requirement
and the sale by lottery, and the ownership
limit  was  tripled.  The  large  corporate
ownership  limit  was  doubled,  and  most
important  to one  or two  very  large  oper-
ators,  Corps  of  Engineers'  projects  were
made  exempt.  Depending  on  how  clever
their  attorneys  are  in  finding  loopholes
(such  as  nondependent  cousins,  aunts,  or
uncles,  and  trusted  employees  who  can
hold land  in  trusts)  the very  large  opera-
252


































- 0 SCM  0
I  I  I  I  I
00  I
I I I  I  I  I  I
I  I  I  I  I  I 00 I  I I  I  I  I I  I
I I  I  I  I  I  I  I
I  I  I I  I  I  I  I
I  I  I1  I I  I I  I  I~1  I  I  I  I
I  I  I CCO  I  I CM
I't  '  I  - I  I  I LO  C  I  I  O  t
0  Nt  i  O  O  0  000  CO  CO  C  O  f- O  LO a  0  N  O  0  O  O  0  0  O ,
0  a  00  a,00 1  10  LO  O  C-  CD  . a
0  CO  C  O  O  C  O  a,  0  t  CMo  C  (0  CM O -'  o  o  o o  ol  L  to  0o0  0N  0  ao  00 m00  0  m  0  O  0  O  O  m  0N  00  D O  N
0  - ,- t0  aO  r-  o  N  - 00  ~  10  ,  , 00)  -r-  ,'-  CY  L0  rl"  o  o  T-0)  0  0  0  T-" r0  0  0)  -1 '  CO  0LO  O  -'CM)  CO  L  Lo) C  CO  .
0  0)  r-  o  (O  0  0  I0-  o  o  o  a  t  o O  C  O  a  >  0  O  O  CD  O  O  CD  Lo
) O)  - (O  L  Co  0  -- LO o  o  oCr  I  t  00 00  C(O  0o  00  CYDO) '  LO t  O  '.  - (CDo I'  Ct  0Mt  CMl,  C  - T-  CO  Co)  Co  t-  T-
-O^ZOOO002=)z<0 <--  z<W
.CO
CO -%  e^n O
0O
o  5_0
· E°  O)  0  c c  CO LO  C
0  co  C  >n  (  co  co
(  0  (S  1  3  CO  75  3  O  T  m  O  0 ^S  ^  L  j  ^S  ^
5




0  T-  CO
L  N-
CM r  O
- CO
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tors  may  or may  not be  worse  off  under
the limitation on total farm size under the
new law.  This provision really only affects
one  water  district,  Westlands  in  Califor-
nia, because  the other  districts  with  very
large  farms were  exempted  either by ad-
ministrative  rule,  the  new  law,  or,  as  in
the case of Imperial  Irrigation  District, the
courts.
I  think  we  must  judge  the  gains  and
losses  of  the  small  farm,  farm  worker
group  represented  by  National  Land  for
People  in  terms  of  the  amount  of  land
available  for lease  or purchase,  and  thus,
a  relative  change  in  raising  or  lowering
the barriers to entry in farming. It appears
they  are  worse  off  now  than they  would
have been  under the sympathetic  legisla-
tion proposed  by Secretary  Andrus.  They
are probably  no better nor worse off than
they were  under  the original  1902  Act  as
it  was being enforced by USBR.
What lessons  can  be learned?  Allegori-
cally,  I recall  the year  when hornets  built
a nest outside our kitchen door. My father
advised  me that  if  I  felt  the  necessity  to
poke  a  stick  into  that hornet's  nest  to  do
so only  if I had  a very  long stick and  was
wearing  track  shoes.  Even  without  this
equipment  I  felt  the  need  to  poke  that
nest. Fleet of foot as I thought I was, those
hornets were  even  swifter.  I gained noth-
ing  from  my  adventure  except  several
painful stings and the knowledge that hor-
nets' nests,  regardless of how enticing,  are
better off left alone.
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